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ABSTRACT.  We consider the situation in which a buyer has to find the 
optimal degree of bundling for buying goods and services. From a review of the 
literature we develop attributes associated with bundling. Each of these 
attributes has an effect on the value of a bundle. Combined, the attributes 
determine the value of a bundle. We describe how the various attributes of a 
bundle contribute to the value of a bundle given the context of the buying 
situation. Based on interviews, a further analysis of bundle attributes and their 
effects on the bundle value is provided. The results of this analysis can be used 
to assist in finding the optimal degree of bundling. 
 
INTRODUCTION OF THE TOPIC 
When a buyer has to purchase a set of products and/or services he 
searches for the optimal way to buy on the market. One of the decisions 
the buyer has to make is whether he bundles the products and/or services 
or buys them in separate lots. For example, buying various products and 
services needed for a construction project separately is an alternative to 
buying a complete project. This is an important decision as it can have a 
large effect on cost components such as the purchasing price and 
operation costs.  
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The bundling decision involves, as observed in our exploratory 
empirical results, a large number of attributes (i.e., dimensions), such as 
the purchasing volume and the risk of bankruptcy or non-delivery. These 
multi-dimensional decision problems are often underestimated and are 
typically based on intuition (Grove and Meehl, 1996): often buyers 
immediately move on to selecting the right supplier for the products or 
services.  
A good understanding on what attributes play a role in bundling 
decisions can help buyers to make better founded decisions about the 
degree of bundling. Unfortunately, current research offers little guidance 
on important attributes for bundling decisions. It is therefore our research 
objective to improve the understanding on bundle composition. 
Specifically, we present a framework for making bundling decisions and 
we elaborate on the concept of bundle attributes. These bundle attributes 
contribute to the value of a bundle and can be used as a basis for a well-
informed bundling decision. We discuss the attributes and their effects 
on the value of a bundle based on a number of practical bundling 
decisions reviewed with purchasers. 
  
LITERATURE ON BUNDLING 
Purchasers have considered bundle options for centuries, though 
little academic discussions seem to be devoted to the decision problem 
(Schoenherr and Mabert, 2008). Most of the bundling literature has been 
written from a seller’s perspective in either a marketing or economics 
literature. In the next two subsections, we discuss the buyer’s and seller’s 
perspectives in more detail.  
Bundling From a Seller’s Perspective 
From a seller’s perspective, marketing literature on bundling has 
examined the firm’s promoting and pricing of bundles (e.g. Ansari, 
Siddarth, and Weinberg, 1996; Ben-Akiva and Gershenfeld, 1998), 
consumer evaluation of bundles (e.g. Johnson, Herrmann, and Bauer, 
1999; Soman and Gourville, 2001), and the optimality of bundling, by 
modeling the various marketing options for a marketeer (e.g. Bakos and 
Brynjolfsson, 2000; Wilson et al., 1990). Economics literature has 
mainly focused on bundling as an entry deterrence mechanism (e.g. 
Nalebuff, 2004; Carlton and Waldman, 2002), bundling and efficiency 
(e.g. Fang and Norman, 2003), and bundling as a profit-maximizing 
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mechanism (e.g. Armstrong, 1999; Avery and Hendershott, 2000). 
Stremersch and Tellis (2002) state, in their examination of the literature 
on bundling from a seller’s perspective, that there is no integrative 
framework that explains what an optimal bundle is, given various factors 
that have an effect on an optimal bundle. Also, they state that the 
literature is ambiguous about definitions for bundling, key conditions for 
optimal bundling and legality of bundling. This makes it even more 
difficult to develop a framework for making optimal bundling decisions 
from a buyer’s perspective. 
Bundling from a Buyer’s Perspective 
The body of literature on bundling from a buyer’s perspective is 
much smaller than that from the seller’s perspective. Only a few topics in 
bundling have been covered from a buyer’s perspective. The study of 
Mabert and Schoeherr (2001) showed that choosing the right bundle 
structure significantly influences the buyer’s perceived performance of 
the bundle. This importance of the bundle structure was later confirmed 
by Beall et al. (2003). This stresses the importance of the decision on the 
correct bundle structure.  
Reasons for bundling by buyers are the benefits towards lowering the 
administrative costs, such as ordering costs (Looman, Ruffin and de 
Boer, 2002). Other authors mention benefits of bundling such as an 
increase of buying power (Ramsay, 2001; Schoenherr and Mabert, 2006) 
or an increase of economies of scale (Birou, Fawcett and Magnan, 1997). 
However, few studies have provided attributes that influence an 
appropriate bundling structure, or tried to construct a framework that can 
be used to determine an appropriate bundling structure. Perhaps Jap’s 
(2002) suggestion of an optimal bundle structure in terms of number of 
items and purchasing spend comes closest. She poses that bundles should 
have a high number of items and a high spend. This should be weighted 
against the potential inability of suppliers to deliver and the loss of 
competition. The paper by Jap provides useful suggestions, but does not 
provide a framework or even a list of attributes.  
Other research on bundling from a buyer’s perspective focuses on 
bundles for reverse auctions. The achievement of price reductions by 
increasing the number of different bundles in the same bidding event has 
been reported by Carter et al (2004) and Hur et al. (2006). Changing the 
bundle composition for repeat auctions can also help to further reduce 
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the price (Arnold et al., 2005). Still, they do not study finding the right 
bundle composition itself. 
This paper adds to the limited body of research on bundling from a 
buyer’s perspective. Besides adding new reasons for bundling to the 
existing literature, we combine these reasons in a framework that can be 
used to determine an appropriate bundling structure. 
 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
The ambiguity in the literature on definitions of bundling, as stated 
by Stremersch and Tellis (2002) in the previous section, calls for a 
further critical analysis. Not clearly defining terms as bundling and 
bundling strategies would make it difficult to compare this study with the 
literature.  
Bundling 
Many different definitions of bundling have been proposed in the 
literature. For example, Adams and Yellen (1976) define bundling as 
“selling goods in packages”. Guiltinan (1987) defines bundling as “the 
practice of marketing two or more products and/or services in a single 
package for a special price”, and Salinger (1995) treats a pair of shoes as 
a bundle. These examples do not only show that definitions of bundling 
are fuzzy and not consistent (Stremersch and Tellis, 2002), they are also 
unclear about the distinction between product and bundle (see the 
definition of Sallinger) and domain of the use of bundling (see the 
definition of Guiltinan). We propose a definition for bundling from a 
buyer’s perspective that tries to overcome the inconsistencies present in 
the literature. 
We propose the definition of bundling as the buying of two or more 
undividable products in one package. We define the term ‘undividable’ 
in means as undividable for buyer’s markets. We explain this term by a 
short example. Consider buying a bundle of electricity for two office 
buildings. According to the definition this will be a bundle of two 
products; you can find a supplier willing to deliver electricity for one of 
your office locations. Buying electricity for a part of an office building 
would be much harder, because no markets exist for supplying electricity 
to parts of office buildings. So the undividable product of the bundle is 
one office building. Considering this example will make it clear that 
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most of the purchasing transaction in practice do have some degree of 
bundling inherent to them. It is our purpose to contribute towards finding 
an optimal degree of bundling. 
Bundle Strategies 
Bundle strategies studied from a buyer’s perspective have not been 
defined very clear. Examples of bundle strategies are described as 
increasing leverage by size and increasing the number of items in a 
bundle (Jap, 2002), bundling of part families (Smeltzer and Carr, 2003), 
and the bundling of items in the same commodity group (Beall et al., 
2003). These strategy descriptions, although suitable in their specific 
context, are not generic in use. Based on interviews with purchasers we 
identify two generic bundling strategies. 
1. Homogeneous bundling strategy: expanding your bundle 
homogeneously is done by adding more of the same products to 
those that you already have in your bundle. Every bundle has a 
dimension, called the degree of homogeneous bundling; the amount 
of exactly the same products in the bundle. 
Example from the interviews: That is our default, we bundle the 
same products over our three locations, unless […] we have done 
that with catering and some IT hardware. 
2. Heterogeneous bundling strategy: expanding your bundle 
heterogeneously is done by adding different products to those you 
already have in your bundle. Every bundle has a dimension, called 
the degree of heterogeneous bundling; the amount of different 
products in the bundle. 
Example from the interviews: We had to build the hangars, the 
building for the restaurant and the platforms […] we saw that as 
one job. 
With the definition of these two strategies we can classify every 
bundle, in their degree of bundling, both homogeneously and 
heterogeneously. Later in this paper we show that different bundling 
strategies also create different bundling effects. 
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THE VALUE OF BUNDLING 
In their search for the optimal bundle structure, buyers assess various 
bundle options, which vary in bundling degree, either homo- and 
heterogeneously. Each of those bundle options has several bundle 
attributes, which can have favorable or not so favorable effects in the 
eyes of buyers.  
We find a theoretical basis for these effects in transaction costs 
economics (TCE). According to this theory buyers seek to minimize their 
Total Cost of Supply (TCS). Homburg and Kuester (2001) distinguish 
three components of these total costs: (1) purchasing price, (2) operation 
costs, and (3) acquisition costs (Noordewier, John and Nevin, 1990). The 
purchasing price refers to direct product costs, for example the actual 
price charged by the supplier. This can be influenced by quantity 
discounts (Elmaghraby and Keskinocak 2003; Schotanus et al., 2007), 
competition (Jap, 2002), selection effects (Linthorst and Telgen, 2008), 
learning effects (Yelle, 1979), logistic effects (Lambooy et al., 2001), et 
cetera. The operation costs are the expenses from the primary business 
operations of the buyer, such as expenses for R&D, manufacturing and 
downtime costs, and costs for internal coordination (Gyrna, 1988). 
Acquisition costs are defined as the costs made in the process of buying 
the product. This can include contracting costs and relationship costs 
(Williamson, 1975).    
The mentioned costs components of total costs of supply can be 
linked to different bundle attributes. For example, the bundle attribute 
volume (Looman et al., 2001) is different for each bundle option. More 
bundling often generates quantity discounts on the price, although in a 
decreasing manner. We call this the effect of the bundle attribute. In 
another example, the bundle attribute of attractiveness for suppliers (Jap, 
2002) could have the effect of less competition and so higher prices paid 
with more bundling, due to constrained capacities or capabilities of the 
suppliers.  
We can visualize these effects as a function of the bundling benefits 
versus the degree of bundling. In Figure 1, we show how such functions 
could look like.  
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FIGURE 1 
The Effect of Attractiveness 
 
 
A buyer faces the complex task to assess the various options in 
bundling. He looks at the attributes of the various options; he estimates 
their effects and the final trade-off. We call this trade-off between 
various effects of the bundle attributes the bundle value. With these 
definitions we can describe the bundle value in terms of the various 
effects of the bundle attributes. 
Bundle value = effect (attribute 1) + effect (attribute 2) + effect 
(attribute …)   
If we continue the example from the beginning of this section, the 
bundle value would be the summation of the bundling benefits of 
competition and the economies of scale. In Figure 2, we visualize how 
the function of bundle value could look like. The differences in the 
effects show us the existence of an optimal degree op bundling, at which 
the bundle value is at its maximum. It is this maximum value that 
purchasers want to achieve with their bundling strategies. 
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FIGURE 2 
The Effect of Volume 
 
 
FIGURE 3 
 The Bundle Value  
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In the next section we will give an overview of all attributes and their 
effects on the bundle value. 
 
RESULTS 
In order to get a more thorough understanding about bundle 
attributes and their effects on the bundle value, seven exploratory 
interviews were conducted. These interviews were conducted with one or 
two experienced purchasers at the same time, for a total of 10 
interviewees. In each of the interviews we discussed a number of cases 
on bundling. In total we discussed 23 cases with the interviewees. The 
interviewed purchasers were faced with the decision how to bundle in 
their daily activities. The purchasers were chosen to represent a variety 
of organizations. This included government departments, police 
departments, schools, energy providers and tobacco manufacturers. 
In the interviews, the purchasers were asked if they could name the 
various bundled options they have had in various tenders and buying 
situations. Also they were asked if they could elaborate on the reasons 
for choosing one particular bundling option. In this way we accessed the 
vast experience of the purchasers on decision-making on bundling. The 
interviews were semi-structured to enable the interviewer to pursue 
interesting statements and elaborate on them during the interview. The 
interviews took one hour on average and were taped. From the 
descriptions and examples of the buyers we could form a list of bundle 
attributes which are linked to the various costs components of the total 
costs of supply. The list of attributes was created during the analyses of 
the tapes. In Table 1 we present the results. 
To the attributes already mentioned in the literature such as 
attractiveness for suppliers (Jap, 2002), volume (Birou, Fawcett and 
Magnan, 1997), and purchasing effort (Looman, Ruffin and de Boer, 
2002), we add the bundle attributes dependency, selection, outsourcing, 
specialization and physical separation. All the bundle attributes have 
effects on the value of the bundle through a cost component. In the 
decision about which degree of bundling to choose, purchasers have to 
combine all, or at least some of the cost components of the attributes into 
a specific bundle value curve. Only then they will be able to find the 
optimal degree of bundling for their buying situation.  
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TABLE 1 
Bundle Attributes and Their Effects 
Bundle attribute and 
description 
Example from the 
interviews 
Effect of the bundle 
attribute on 
Attractiveness for suppliers  
The bundle is attractive 
enough to generate enough 
competition, as well as on 
the short as on the long term.
You can bundle, but not 
too much, the bundle must 
be interesting for small and 
large companies. 
Price Competition 
 
Volume 
The volume of the bundle 
drives the supplier to offer 
discounts 
With this size the bundle 
just had a nice volume that 
generated some discount 
benefits. 
 Quantity 
discounts 
Subcontracting 
The supply of the 
components of the bundle is 
passed on to subcontractors. 
Why don’t we split it up, 
then the subcontractors can 
place bids […] they are 
cheaper. 
 Splitting 
effect 
 
Physical separation 
The components of the 
bundle are supplied to 
different geographical 
locations. 
Because the areas of the 
works were adjacent to 
each other, we could buy it 
as a bundle. 
 Logistics 
costs 
Specialization 
The delivery of the 
components of the bundle is 
the core-business of the 
contracted suppliers. 
If it doesn’t belong to the 
core-business of the 
supplier, we split it off, 
that makes it commercial 
more interesting. 
Price Learning 
Effect 
Integration  
The integration of the 
components of the bundle 
can create value.  
When different 
components of the 
installation are highly 
dependent on each other 
that would be a reason for 
us to buy in a bundle. 
Opera-
tion 
costs 
Internal 
coordination 
costs 
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
Bundle attribute and 
description 
Example from the 
interviews 
Effect of the bundle 
attribute on 
Risks  
The risk of bankruptcy or 
non-delivery of the 
components of the bundle.  
 
…and if the contractor 
goes bankrupt, the project 
will be delayed […] with a 
main contractor that will 
not happen. 
 Downtime 
costs 
Coordination 
The need of coordination 
between the components of 
the bundle by the buyer. 
It is the policy here to 
leave the coordination to 
the suppliers […] we want 
to keep it as simple as 
possible here. 
Acquisi-
tion 
costs 
Relationship 
costs 
 
Purchasing effort 
The effort of buying the 
components in a bundle or 
separately. 
If you are going to buy all 
the activities separately, 
you do not want to know 
how much time that is 
going to take. 
Acquisi-
tion 
costs  
Contracting 
costs 
 
Still there is the matter of which degree of bundling, homogenous or 
heterogeneous as described in the critical analysis, would be most 
appropriate. We propose that not all attributes of the bundle change the 
bundle value when a solely homogeneous or heterogeneous bundling 
strategy is pursued. From the data of the interviews, we discovered that 
the reasons for bundling mentioned, were linked with either a 
homogeneous or a heterogeneous strategy of bundling. As is shown in 
Table 2, quantity discounts are not considered as a reason for 
heterogeneous bundling. Splitting and learning effects and internal 
coordination costs are not considered as a reason for homogeneous 
bundling. Although it says nothing about the correctness of the 
considerations of the buyers, it gives an indication of the perceived 
importance of these cost components when pursuing different bundle 
strategies. 
The conclusion of these analyses is that we can visualize components 
of bundle value. In addition, we can point out differences in these  
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TABLE 2 
The Influence of Bundle Strategy on Bundle Value 
Mentioned as a reason for: Effects  
homogeneous 
bundling 
heterogeneous 
bundling 
Competition 9 9 
Quantity discounts 9  
Splitting effect  9 
Logistics costs 9 9 
Learning effect  9 
Internal coordination costs  9 
Downtime costs 9 9 
Relationship costs 9 9 
Contracting costs 9 9 
 
components when pursuing homogeneous or heterogeneous bundling 
strategies. From a practical point view an assessment of bundle attributes 
makes it easier for a practitioner to find the right degree of bundling. 
 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This paper has explored the various attributes of bundles from a 
buyer’s perspective. We add to literature by presenting an overview of 
attributes and their effects on the value of bundling. We also propose a 
framework which simplifies bundling decisions for purchasers. However, 
this article has several limitations that further research could address. 
First, the list of attributes has been generated from the experiences of 
many purchasers and we tried to find as many attributes as possible, but 
we do not claim having found every bundle attribute. To make the list 
more complete, further research could focus on finding more attributes of 
bundles that are relevant in the bundling decisions, by more extensive 
empirical and literature research. Second, when changing the degree of 
bundling, it is not yet clear how the effects of the bundle attributes 
change. In this paper we propose some examples how the curves of the 
effects could look like, but we only do this with the purpose of clarifying 
the concept. Further research could focus on the question how these 
effects influence the bundling value. For example, the effects of the 
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bundle attribute subcontracting on bundling (Linthorst and Telgen, 
2008). Finally, we plan to further investigate how an optimal degree of 
bundling can be determined.  
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